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As noted by Haspelmath ( 1 997), determiners and pronouns sensitive to "knowledge 
of the speaker" exist in different languages . Examples are the -to series in Russian, 
some and a certain (see Farkas, thi� volume), and irgendein in German (Kratzer 
200 1 ) .  This paper examines the episternic properties of a set of French determiners , 
i .e .  un N quelconque (some), quelque (some) and un certain (a certain) . They ap­
pear to be in complementary distribution due to their symmetric sensitivities to the 
epistemic status of the NP referent. We aim to contribute to a better understanding 
of their sensitivity by relating it to the well-known problem of "identifiability" in 
epistemic logic .  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the basic 
data on un N quelconque and introduce the notion of identification needed to spell 
out the conditions of non-identification required by this expression. We discuss 
differences and points of contact between ignorance and indifference to the identity 
of the referent, which brings us to contrast the items under examination with free 
choice items (FCIs) . Then, we take into consideration the fact that the epistemic 
agent is not necessarily the speaker, but several perspectives may be taken up. In 
section 3, we look at un certain which, on the contrary, seems to require the referent 
to be identified. We show that, beside the speaker's knowledge of the referent, there 
must be another independent identification. Finally, in section 4, we look at the 
interaction of these determiners with abstract mass nouns .  
2.  Un quelconque 
French has two determiners that express ignorance about the referent, i .e .  quelque 
and un quelconque . Quelque is formal and old fashioned in modern French and 
has in effect been replaced by un quelconque. Accordingly, we will focus on the 
latter. However we will consider the combination quelque with abstract mass, nouns 
at the end of the paper. Un quelconque shows up in the two constructions un N 
quelconque (UQ 1 )  and un quelconque N (UQ2) . We consider UQ2 to be a variant 
of UQ 1 where the indiference value is "stronger" , in a sense to be made clear at the 
end of section 2 .3 .  We will focus on UQ l in the rest of the paper. 
2.1. Basic properties 
In this  section, we review the properties of un N quelconque (UQ 1 ) .  This phrase 
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is fine in "modal" contexts, that is,  sentences expressing probability ( I  a,b) , possi­
bility ( I c) ,  obligation ( l d), permission ( I e) ,  command/suggestion ( 1£) ,  or habitual 
sentences ( 1  g) . 
( 1 )  a. Marie a probablement loue une voiture quelconque 
'Mary probably rented some car' 
b. Marie a dtl louer une voiture quelconque 
'Mary must have rented some car or other' 
c . Marie a pu louer une voiture quelconque 
'Mary was able to rent some car' 
d. Marie doit louer une voiture quelconque , 
'Mary has to rent some sort of car' 
e. Marie a Ie droit de louer une voiture quelconque 
'Mary is allowed to rent some sort of car' 
f. Loue une voiture quelconque 
'Rent some car or other' 
g. Quand elle etait en vaeances, Marie louait habituellement une voiture 
quelconque 
'On holiday, Mary usually rented some car' 
In episodic non-modal sentences, UQ I is appropriate when the sentence is com­
patible with the assumption that the speaker cannot identify the reference of UQ 1 . 
(2b) is anomalous, because, under normal circumstances, it implies that the speaker 
is able to identify the referent. 
(2) a. Susanne a epouse un copain de fae quelconque, que je ne connais  pas 
'Susan married some university friend, whom I don' t  know' 
b. J' ai rencontre ?? un ami quelconque 
' 1  met some friend' 
UQ l is not always appropriate with non-specific NPs .  
(3) a .  Pour mon anniversaire, je voudrais une lampe de bureau ?? quelconque 
'For my birthday, I would like some desk lamp ' 
b. n me faut un livre quelconque sur les types recursifs 
'J need some book on recursive types '  
In generic sentences, UQ I is not appropriate when it  occurs as restrictiop of a 
generic operator. In (4c) , UQ l is in the scope. 
(4) a. Un animal doit etre soigneusement nourri 
'An animal must be fed with care ' 
b. Un animal ?? quelconque doit etre soigneusement nourri 
'Some animal must be fed with care' 
c .  Un chat doit avoir un  jouet quelconque 
'A cat must have some sort of a toy ' 
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UQ 1 i s  also appropriate in downward-entailing contexts where it can function as a 
minimiserlNegative Polarity Item, exactly as un. We will leave aside this particular 
function, as it is the likely product of un' s  contribution . 
(5) a. Marie n' a pas rencontre un etudiant 
'Mary did not meet any student' 
b. Marie n' a pas rencontre un etudiant quelconque 
'Mary did not meet any student' 
Note that, like un and a in English, UQ l may "escape" negation in referential read­
ings . In (6), for instance, the intended interpretation is that there is some particular 
code that Mary did not type in. 
(6) Marie n 'a  pas dti rentrer un code quelconque, ce qui a suspendu Ie systeme 
'There must be some code Mary failed to type in, which stalled the system' 
Examples ( 1 )  and (2) suggest the following constraint on UQl .  
(7) Non-Identification A sentence with UQl is not felicitous when it implies 
that the speaker is able to identify the referent of UQ 1 .  
The next section spells out the notion of identification. Examples (3) and (4) cannot 
be reduced to the simple constraint in (7) and will be dealt with in section 2.3 . 
2.2. Identification 
The notion of identification concerns the epistemic status of a cognitive agent with 
respect to a set of individuals .  An agent a identifies an individual d E D if and 
only if a is able to discriminate between d and the other members of D. Identifica­
tion is usually associated with "descriptions" , a cover tenn for aggregates (Dekker, 
1 998) ,  individuation schemes (Gerbrandy 1998, 2000) and counterparts (Geach 
1 967, Lewis 1 968, van Rooy 1997, Zeevat 1 997, Aloni 200 1 ,  etc. ) .  
A Description � i s  a bundle of  properties . An individual a is identified 
through � whenever it is the only individual which satisfies � .  Identification is 
essentially opposed to intentional identity in the sense of (Geach 1 967). More for­
mally, the basic notion is that of type in model theory, that is, a set of formulas 
which characterizes all the (n-tuples of) individuals which satisfy them. Following 
Hodges ( 1 997, p. 39), we have the definition in (8). 
(8) Type Let T be a theory in the language L.  An n-type of T <1>(Xl . . .  Xn) 
for n finite is any subset of T in the free variables X l  . . .  Xn . 
X abbreviates the sequence Xl . . . Xn . 
The denotation of an n-type w.r.t. some model M is the set of sequences (aI , . . .  , an ) 
which satisfy the type. 
(9) Type denotation The denotation of <1>(x) w.r.t .  M, [<1> (X)]M is the set 
{ (al , '  . .  , an )  I al . . .  an E DM & M F <1> (x) [X � ii] } . 
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Note that when n = 0, an n-type <P is a set of closed formulas . [<p] is then the set 
of finite sequences of elements of D M or the empty set. 
( 10) An n-type <P is proper iff (i) it is non-empty and (ii) n > o .  
Epistemic individuation amounts to identification through types in an epis­
temic setting, i .e .  a situation where an agent contemplates several "alternatives", 
or mutually incompatible models of a language. Let us assume, for simplicity, that 
(i) we work in a "full" language (each individual of the domain has a name in the 
language: a B ca) and that (ii) constant symbols are rigid (they receive a unique 
interpretation in the domain) . 
( 1 1 )  Information state An information state (i .s . )  s = (M, D) is a set of mutu­
ally incompatible models over a common non-empty domain D. An agent a 
knows that ¢ if she entertains an i . s �  s in which Mi 1= ¢ for every Mi E M. 
Let <P Ko. denote the set of formulas ¢ such that a knows that ¢. 
An agent a knows which entities satisfy the proper n-type W whenever W gets the 
same denotation in every model of M. 
( 1 2) Knowing which a knows which entities satisfy the proper n-type W in 
s = (M, D) iff for each sequence (Cl . . .  en) and every ¢(Xl . . .  xm) E W ,  
either ¢ [x +- C1 E <PKa or -¢[x +- C1 E <PKa · 
The formal counterpart of (7) is ( 1 3 ) .  
( 1 3) UQl A sentence with a tripartite structure [uQ I ]  [N] [P] is appropriate 
only under an interpretation (i .s . )  s such that the speaker dOes not know 
which entity satisfies the proper I-type {N(x) & P (x) } in s .  
We account for examples ( 1 )-(4) a s  follows .  First, for the modal non­
specific examples ( 1  a-f), given an i . s .  s = (M, D) ,  and a modal necessity or possi­
bility operator 0, the logical form is: 
o [3x (x is a car & Mary rented x) ] .  
The type i s  not necessarily rigid across the different models of the information 
space. Mary may have had the possibility, the permission, the obligation, etc . ,  to 
rent any appropriate car, not a particular one. Adopting a standard quantificational 
view on the representation of habitual sentences (de Swart 1 99 1 ) ,  we posit ( 1 g ' )  as 
the logical form of ( 1 g) .  
( 1 )  g ' . HAB s [Mary i s  on vacations i n  s & s i s  past] [3x ( x  i s  a car i n  s & Mary 
rents x in s ) ]  
Second, i t  is the specific reading that is preferred for (2a) ; so ,  Susan married 
a particular university friend, but his identity is unknown to the speaker. In practice, 
this means that the proper I-type (x is a university friend & Susan married x) is not 
satisfied by the same individual in every alternative of M. In contrast, the preferred 
interpretation of (2b) is one where the agent has perceptually identified the friend. 
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We introduce a rigid predi cate P ERCsp that applies to the object perceptually iden­
tified by the speaker in the situation. Since every model in M supports :3x(I met x 
& x is a friend & PERC Pap (x) ) , we see that the proper I-type (I met x & x is a 
friend & PERC Psp (x) ) is satisfied by the same individual in every alternative of 
M 
2.3 . Non-identification and indifference 
Non-specific contexts like (3) raise a more difficult problem. Consider (3a) and 
suppose that it is issued in a situation where I have no precise idea of the kind of 
desk lamp I need. In this case, the speaker is unable to identify the lamp .  So ,  
why is UQ 1 anomalous? A similar observation holds for progressive sentences . In 
modal/inferential approaches to the progressive (see Dowty 1 979, Landman 1 992 ,  
Zucchi 1 999 among many others) ,  a sentence like ( 14) has an interpretation in 
which I may not  have a very precise idea of the paper I am currently writing. So 
several different articles might result from my current activity. Yet, UQ l is not 
felicitous . 
( 14) a. Je suis en train d' ecrire un article 
'I am writing a paper' 
b. Je suis en train d' ecrire un article ?? quelconque 
'I am writing some paper or other' 
In fact, the property of UQ 1 responsible for these anomalies manifests itself more 
covertly in (2a) , where the speaker signals that she has no means to identify the per­
son whom Susan married. Since the relative clause ( 'whom I don't  know' )  entails 
the same information, one may wonder whether UQ 1 really adds something to the 
meaning. Intuitively, (2a) conveys the impression that the speaker is unconcerned 
with Mary's  marriage . Van de Velde (2000) proposes that quelque, similar to UQ l 
in many respects as noted above, signals that the identity of the referent is irrelevant. 
This seems to be the case in (2a) ,  which has a 'I don't  care' flavour. Farkas (this 
volume) and von Fintel (2000) mention similar possibilities for some and whatever. 
We will speake of the indifference value of UQ 1 .  This value is not automatically 
triggered by UQ 1 .  In Gricean terms, it is cancellable. For instance, the identity of 
the referent is relevant in ( 1 5a,b) . 
( 1 5 )  a .  Marie a dfi etre mise au courant du projet par un employe quelcpnque, 
et il faudrait savoir qui 
'Mary must have learnt about the project from some employee and we 
need to know who it is '  
b .  La victime a forcement entendu un bruit que1conque, mais je me de­
mande bien quoi 
'Surely, the victim heard some noise, but I really wonder what'  
One might speculate that, being (i ) connected with the presence of a particular de­
terminer (UQ l )  and (ii) cancellable, the indi fference value is a generalized conver-
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sational implicature (OCI) in the sense of Grice ( 1 967) . However, one should say 
why the attempted cancellation fail s  in (2c) ,  which sounds somewhat incoherent. 
As pointed out by Geurts ( 1 999: 1 9-23 )  in particular, cancellation of implicatures 
is not analogous to the phenomenon of presupposition projection. For instance, in 
(2d), the existence of Susan ' s  husband is suspended by the si-clause. Implicatures 
result from the contextual interpretation of a sentence as a whole and cannot be 
easily defeated by additional information . i  
(2) c. Susanne a epouse un copain de fac quelconque, ?? que j '  aimerais bien con­
naitre 
' Susan married some university friend, whom I'd like to know' 
• 
d. Le mari de Susanne doit etre heureux, si elle est mariee 
' Susan's husband must be happy, if she is married' 
These variations suggest that UQ I has a more complex profile than what ( 1 3) cap­
tures. ( 1 3) is like an antilicensing condition stating that UQ I is not licensed in 
environments where the preferred interpretation violates non-identification. SO, 
UQI communicates two implicatures, expressed in ( 1 6) .  
( 1 6) A sentence with a tripartite structure [uQ I ]  [N] [P] 
(i) conventionally implicates (literal meaning) that the speaker is in an i . s . s 
such that she ignores which entity satisfies the proper I-type {N(x) & P (x) } 
in s,  
( i i )  communicates, as a Gel, the idea that the speaker is unconcerned with 
the identity of the entity satisfying the proper I-type {N (x) & P (x) } in s .  
As with every OCI, when the context makes it clear that the literal meaning i s  the 
preferred interpretive option, the Gel can be suspended. ( 1 6) accounts for the vari­
ability observed in (3) and ( 15) .  In (3a) , the speaker is unconcerned with the identity 
of the lamp, but this clashes with the indication 'for my birthday ' ,  which implicates 
that she expects or hopes to like it. In (3b), the speaker might be unconcerned with 
the identity of the book as far as it contains standard material on recursive types . In 
( 1 5) ,  the Gel is defeated by the abductive interpretation: the speaker stresses the 
fact that she was only able to derive an incomplete conclusion, and that a crucial 
piece of information is lacking. 
A generic sentence like (4b) raises a more difficult problem. Its logical form 
is (4b ' ) , assuming a GEN operator of the type described in (Carlson & Pelletier 
1995) .  ' 
(4) b ' . GENs [ [UQ I x ]  [x is a cat] [x exists in s] ]  [one must feed x with care in s] 
(4b ' )  says that, in situations s that pertain to the evaluation of the generic sentence, 
when there are "some" cats in s, they must be fed with care. This logical form does 
not violate constraint ( 1 3), since it is possible for the speaker to ignore which cats 
exist in the relevant situations .  The GCI is clearly inappropriate since the speaker 
does not have to be concerned or unconcerned with the identity of cats in possi­
ble situations .  The literal meaning does not offer an escape hatch either, because 
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generic quantification via GEN involves ignorance about individual referents . So ,  
i t  i s  unlikely that the speaker wants to  emphasize this ignorance independently, 
through the use of UQ l .  Note that this is a general property of generic sentences : 
since they conventionally imply that the speaker is not referring to any specific 
entity, the literal meaning (conventional implicature) of UQ I cannot be used to re­
deem the combination of UQ 1 with genericity. This means that, in such cases, we 
have to find some motivation for the GCl of UQ 1 .  
As expected, generic sentences can host UQ1 when the GCI can be per­
ceived as adding relevant information. This is typically the case in possibility sen­
tences like the following ones .  
, 
( 1 7) a. On peut se reincarner en un animal quelconque 
'One can be reincarnated as any animal ' 
b. Avec ce nouveau logiciel , on peut scanner un texte que1conque2 
'With this new software, one can scan any text' 
The variant of ( 1 7a) without UQ1  (On peut se reincarner en un animal ' One can be 
reincarnated as an animal ' )  does not imply that any animal is an admissible host for 
reincarnation . By using UQ 1 ,  the speaker indicates that she is indifferent to which 
animal is considered. There are (at least) two ways in which this indifference can 
be interpreted. First, as in the previous case, the indifference may be affective (the 
speaker is simply unconcerned), but it is an implausible situation. Asserting that 
a property holds of the members of a class and implying that one is unconcerned 
with which member is considered, seem two totally unconnected attitudes. So, the 
affective scenario fails. Second, the speaker might consider that the truth of her 
judgment does not depend on the identity of the animals .  She is unconcerned with 
. the information because her contribution to the discourse does not depend on it. In 
such cases, UQ 1 carries the same meaning as a free-choice item like n ' importe quel 
or any (Jayez & Tovena 200 1 ) . 
One might object that this free-choice reading should apply to generics like (4b) .  
A widening/strengthening effect a la Kadmon and Landman ( 1 993)  might produce 
the reading 'absolutely every animal must be fed with care ' . But, clearly, this is not 
the case . To see why, we have to take into account the peculiar semantic structure 
of generics with indefinite singular subjects (IS-generics) .  Greenberg (this vol­
ume) recently proposed that IS-generics assert a connection between properties in 
virtue of a linking property. For instance, (4a) expresses a connection between the 
property of being an animal and the property of being fed with care in virtUe of a 
third property (presumably that of being sensitive to the quality of food) . Following 
Greenberg3 , (4a) would be represented as (4a') ,  where w is the world of evaluation. 
(4) a' . 3PVw' (IF x is an animal in w' & x satisfies P in WI & P is associated 
with the property of being an animal in w , THEN V x, s (s is in WI & x is 
a cat in s => x must be fed with care in s» 
A property is associated with the restriction in virtue of epistemic, deontic, legal ,  
or  stereotypical knowledge. The idea behind Greenberg' S  analysis is that there is 
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a mediating property (P) between the restriction and the scope of the IS-generic 
judgment. Obviously, this does not entail that every entity denoted by the subject of 
the generic sentence possesses the mediating property, since this property is simply 
associated (not entailed) . 
Using n 'importe quel or any, as in N'importe quel animal doit etre nourri 
avec soin 'Any animal must be fed with care' signals that we can consider mediating 
properties which are weaker than those associated with the restriction, potentially 
including cases otherwise excluded. For instance, if the initial mediating property 
denotes the set of stereotypical animals, saying that ' any animal must be fed with 
care' may convey the idea that even non-stereotypical animals must be fed with 
care . This is a simple case of what Kadmon and Landman call "widening" .4 UQ l 
does not imply that the mediating property is extended. It only implies that the 
speaker is indifferent to the identity of the individuals which satisfy the generic.  
In contrast, it  says nothing about the fact that these individuals are stereotypical 
or not. In many contexts, the irrelevance of individuals for the speaker can be 
interpreted as motivated by the belief that the generic has no or few exceptions, 
whence the impression that UQl and n 'importe quel ' any '  do exactly the same job. 
In fact they don ' t: the "absence" of exception is a particularized conversational 
implicature in the case of UQ 1 ,  whereas it is a conventional implicature on the case 
of n ' importe quel. To ease a comparison of their semantic profiles, in ( 1 8) we cast 
the contribution of n 'importe quel in Greenberg's  format. 
( 1 8) An IS-generic sentence of form [N ' IMPORTE QUEL] [R] [S] convention­
ally implicates that the mediating property P is a superset of the property 
associated with the restriction R. 
So, interpreting UQ l in an IS-generic structure does not produce a natural reading 
because the affective scenario i s  useless and the epistemic scenario is not available. 
Generic when or if-clauses like ( 1 9) demonstrate the importance of the Gel of 
UQ 1 .  The scope property (the obligation of feeding with care) is  not predicated 
directly of animals but of animals in particular situations or of individual-situation 
pairs . So, the logical form of ( 1 9) is ( 1 9 ' ) .  As the generic operator bears on situa­
tions, ( 1 9 ' ) leaves open the possibility that, in the situations considered for evaluat­
ing the generic, the type of the animal is not just any type. By implying that this i s  
indeed the case, UQ 1 retains a certain informativity, in  the episternic scenario. 
( 1 9) Quand/Si on a un animal quelconque, il faut Ie nourrir avec soin 
'WhenlIf one has some animal, one must feed it with care'  
( 1 9) , [GENs ] [one has an animal in s] [one must feed it with care in s] 
Summarizing, we have proposed that the indifference value of UQ 1 is a Ger, mo­
tivated by (at least) two different scenarios which interact in certain ways with var­
ious semantic structures . Note that, if one follows von Fintel (2000: def. 2 1 ) , the 
indifference value of whatever is nearer to free-choiceness than to the lack of con­
cern suggested by UQ l 
Next, we have to add something to account for contrasts such as (20), that 
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suggest that UQ 1 is intrinsically derogatory or indiscriminative, like just any (Hom 
2000), and conflicts with laudatory terms like genie ' genius' . 
(20) a. Pour resoudre ce probleme il faudrait un genie (? quelconque) 
'To solve this problem we need a genius (some genius) ' 
b. Un imbecile (quelconque) a dil laisser la lumiere allumee 
'An (Some) idiot must have left the lights on ' 
(20a) is paralleled by He is not??just any genius, but this is not the case in examples 
like (2 1 ) .  Thus,  instead of associating with UQl a derogatory value, we propose 
that the semantic category of the N must not presuppose that the denoted entities 
have particular abilities or (positive hr negative) qualities . This corresponds in part 
to Lyon's idea ( 1977) that in pairs like small vs big, only the latter adjective refers 
to an actual property. Big things "have bigness", they don' t  "lack smallness" . Small 
things don ' t  "have smallness", they "lack bigness". 
(2 1 )  S i  tu as u n  probleme quelconque avec ta machine, appelle-moi 
'If you have any problem with your computer, cal  me' 
The distinction between imbecile and genie in (20) would match the fact that one 
does not need any special ability to be an idiot. Similar contrasts exist for petit 
' small ' vs grand 'big' or laid ' ugly ' vs beau 'beautiful ' .  So,  the constraint we put 
on UQ 1 is that the N must not denote a class of entities which are unfrequent or 
exceptional in any respect. Since this is not a cancellable aspect of the determiner, 
we consider it as a conventional implicature in its core meaning. The presence of 
this negative (antilicensing) condition accounts for the fact that UQ1 and the adjec­
tive quelconque are only partly similar. Quelconque as an adjective is derogatory 
and denotes things which are nondescript: des vetements quelconques ' nondescript 
clothes ' ,  Je suis un cuisinier quelconque ' I  am a poor cook' . So, it is not felicitous 
in contexts where, clearly, the denoted entity can be any entity in the class .  
(22) Si tu as un probleme ?? quelconque-ADJ, delicat ou pas,  appelle-moi 
'If you have a routine problem, tricky or not, call me' 
2.4. The problem of perspectives 
Up to this point, we have been assuming that the speaker is the only epistemicfl.gent. 
But this is not always the case. For instance (23a) is odd because, in its preferred 
interpretation, the event is presented under the perspective of the agent, who is not 
the speaker and who is supposed to know which car she sees . This perspective is 
probably facilitated or imposed by the passe simple ( ' simple past' ) ,  which stresses 
the distance from the utterance time (Vetters, 1 996: 1 55) .  
(23)  a .  Marie se  pencha par la  fenetre et  aper�ut une voiture ?? quelconque, que 
je ne pouvais pas voir 
'Mary leant out of the window and saw some car, which I couldn 't see' 
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b. Marie se pencha par la fenetre et dut voir une voiture quelconque, dont 
j' entendis Ie moteur 
'Mary leant out of the window and probably saw some car, of which I 
heard the engine' 
Perspectives (viewpoints, focal points, etc . )  are well-known in literary studies 
(Booth 1 983, Genette 1 983 ,  Achard-Bayle 200 1 ,  etc . ) .  Formally, they are usu­
ally represented by means of epistemic logics (Hintikka 1962, Fagin et al . 1 995,  
Gerbrandy 1 998) .  The standard translation of the epistemic situation in (23a) is as 
in (23a' ) ,  where K is a knowledge operator and s is the speaker. 
(23) a' . Ks 3!x(KMary X is a car &'Mary saw x) 
(23a' ) is true at w i f  and only if 3 !x (KMary X is a car & Mary saw x ) is true at every 
world WI Ks-accessible from w. This entails, in turn, that for each such w' , there 
is a unique individual, say awl , that satisfies the proper I-type (x is a car & Mary 
saw x) in M = {w" : w" is KMary-accessible from w'} . As expected, the speaker 
s does not know which car Mary saw. Adopting the perspective of Mary means 
to consider any set of worlds KMary-accessible from some w' . More generally, we 
define perspectives as localizations in possibilities in the sense of Gerbrandy ( 1 998) .  
(24) Let 12 be a (full) language and A a finite set of agents . A possibility over 12 
and A is a function 7r such that: 
1 .  7r(12) is a model of 12, and 
2. 7r(a) , for every a E A is a set of possibilities called an information state 
(i . s . ) .  
1 . s .  are noted (J, (Ji , etc . Truth is defined as expected. A formula ¢ is true at a 
possibility 7r, 7r 1= cp in symbols, if and only if 7r (12) 1= ¢. It is true at an i . s .  (J if and 
only if, for each 7r E 0', 7r 1= cp. In the simple model adopted here, a perspective is 
just a set of i . s .  nodes in the tree associated with a possibility. E.g. ,  the perspective 
assigned to Mary by the speaker s is the set of i .s .  Mary-accessible from each a­
accessible poss ibility, i .e. the set {O' : 7ri (Mary) = 0' for some pii E 7r (s ) } . In the 
general case, we 
(25) Let 7r be a possibility. An information path (i.p .)  in 7r is any finite sequence 
of the form (Xl ,  7rl , X2 , 7r2 . . .  , xn , 0') such that the xi 's  are in A, 7rl E 7r (Xl ) , 
for each Xi (1 < i < n) : 7ri E 7ri-l (Xi) and 0' = 7rn-l (Xn ) . 
For a given sequence of agents (Xl . . . xn) ,  the perspective at this sequence is the 
set of i . s .  that form the endpoints of the i .p. using this sequence. 
(26) Let w = (Xl . . .  xn) be a finite sequence of agents. The perspective at w i s  
the set of i . s .  defined by {O'i : there is  an i.p. of the form (Xl , 7rl  . . .  Xn , (Ji ) } 
in the total possibility 7r .  
The next step is to redefine 'knowing which ' for possibilities and perspectives .  
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(27) Knowing which under perspectives Let w = (Xl . . .  a) be a sequence of 
agents and II the perspective at w. a knows which entities satisfy the proper 
n-type W under II iff a knows which entities satisfy the type in each member 
of II. 
(27) amounts to saying that, no matter which i .s .  is considered at the endpoint of 
a given i .p . ,  the agent knows which entities satisfy the type when she is in this i . s .  
Adopting the perspective "of' an agent consists , in this type of representation ,  in 
evaluating a sentence at the perspective which describes the way in which a se­
quence of agents sees the information that this agent has .  For instance, adopting the 
perspective of Mary in (23) is not seeing the world "as Mary sees it" but rather as 
the speaker believes that Mary sees k The relevant perspective is then the perspec­
tive at (s ,  Mary) . More generally, we can replace the notion of information state as 
a set of models by that of perspectives at a sequence of agents . Definition ( 1 3) must · 
then be slightly modified, as in (28) .  
(28) A sentence with a tripartite structure [uQ l ]  [N] [P] is appropriate only under 
a perspective II at w such that the last agent of w does not know which entity 
satisfies the proper I-type {N(x) & P(x) } under II.  
3. Un certain 
Certain forms three determiners in French : un certain, certain, and certains .5 As­
sessing their interrelation, diachronically and semantically, is a complex task that 
exceeds the scope of this paper (see Allaert 1999 for some observations). We sim­
ply note that (i) certain, like quelque, is somewhat formal and old fashioned and 
(ii) data suggest that certains is not just the plural of un certain .  For instance (29b) 
is less natural than (29a) in isolation. In what follows we focus on un certain (UC) . 
(29) a. Certains collegues ont accepte de relire mon article 
'Certain colleagues accepted to ·read over my paper' 
b. #Un certain collegue a accepte de relire mon article 
'A certain colleague accepted to read over my paper' . 
3.1. Basic facts 
As noted by Van de Velde (2000), UC is, to some extent, symmetric to quelque. 
This observation extends to UQ l .  By and large, UC is possible with episodic non­
modal sentences, not always felicitous in modal sentences and possible with ab­
stract nouns. 
(30) a. I' ai rencontre un certain diplomate dont on m' avait parle 
'I met a certain diplomat whom I had heard of' 
b. Jean a dil avoir #un certain probleme 
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'John must have had a certain problem' 
c. Jean a fait preuve d'une certaine intelligence 
'John showed a certain amount of intelligence' 
These and similar data suggest that, in contrast with UQ 1 and queZque, UC requires 
the referent to be already known. This squares well with its compatibility with 
proper nouns (un certain Jean 'a certain John ' )  which have an intrinsic identifica­
tion potential according to some analyses (Geurts 1 997). However, calibrating this 
'previous acquaintance' is not easy. It is not necessarily knowledge of the speaker 
(3 1 a) and the knowledge criterion does not apply to certain collocations (3 1b) .  In 
the next section, we consider two proposals for analyzing UC in French and a cer-
, 
tain in English . 
(3 1 )  a. Jean a mentionne un certain diplomate 
'John mentioned a certain diplomat' 
b. Jean a dO se douter du complot a partir d 'un certain moment 
' John must have suspected the conspiracy at some stage ' 
3.2. Distinction and specificity 
A classical reference on certains in French is (Gondret 1 976) . This author proposes 
that certains must refer to a set whose members can be ' distinguished' ,  that i s ,  
retain their individuality. For instance, Gondret explains the impossibility of (32) 
by pointing out that the kilometers which are referred to are not individualized. 
(32) n habite a * certains kilometres 
'He lives *certain kilometers from here' 
Allaert ( 1 999 : 1 45) takes up this intuition and summarizes the behavior of UC with 
concrete nouns by the slogan un certain N = un N distinct parmi I '  ensemble des N 
( 'A certain N = a distinguished N-thing within the set of N-things ' ) .  While the intu­
ition is correct, the idea of distinction remains extremely vague as a criterion . Sup­
pose, for instance, that indefinites are represented by means of choice functions, as 
proposed in many recent contributions on determination (see Reinhart 1 992, 1 997 
for two seminal papers). Let us consider (29c), a variant of (29b) containing the 
standard indefinite un ' a' ,  and its possible representation in (29c ' ) ,  f being a choice 
function variable . 
(29) c. Un collegue a accepre de relire mon article 
'A colleague accepted to read over my paper' 
c ' . f(COLLEAGUE) accepted to read over my paper 
If un certain collegue in (29b) involves ' distinction' ,  the choice of the choice func­
tion that can be the value of f must be constrained in some way. Kratzer ( 1 998)  
identifies the problem for a certain. Developping and modifying Hintikka's ( 1 986) 
analysis, based on scope, she proposes that (a) a certain only has a specific inter-
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pretation and (b) the choice function for a certain has an additional argument which 
allows for the relativization of choice functions to individuals.  
For instance, Hintikka's ( 1 986) example (33) receives the representation in 
(33 ' ) .  The value of 1 must be a function which, given an individual (a value for x) 
and the set of dates DATE, picks out a date. So, it is a relativized choice function . 
(33) Each husband had forgotten a certain date-his wife's birthday 
(Hintikka's ( 1 986) example (3» 
(33 ' )  'Vx(x i s  a husband � x had forgotten 1 (x ,  DATE) )  
How do we determine the connection between the individual and 1?  According 
to Kratzer, the value of 1 is contextually determined. For (33), 1 must pick x's  
wife birthday im  DATK Similarly� in a question like Is Richard dating a certain 
woman ? (Kratzer's example ( 1 1 », a likely anchor (the value of x) is the speaker 
and the choice function "picks out a woman that the speaker has in mind" (Kratzer 
1 998 :  1 69) . Using a version of Kratzer's proposal for French UC would create a 
problem similar to that inherent to Allaert's  approach. It is not enough to say that the 
choice function is contextually determined. For instance, (29b) would be associated 
with the logical form in (29b ' ) .  
(29b ' )  1 (x,COLLEAGUE) accepted to read over my paper 
Following the spirit of Kratzer's proposal, one might say that 1 picks out a colleague 
that the speaker has in mind. Now, the speaker has certainly in mind one of the 
colleagues who accepted to read over the paper. However, this is not the natural 
interpretation of (29b) . One cannot just think of a colleague who helped her for 
a paper and utter (29b) . That is why the perception of the sentence is blurred for 
some speakers . The following dialogue goes in the same direction. 
(34) A - Qui a revise ton article? 'Who revised your paper? ' 
B - #Un certain collegue 'A certain colleague' 
B 's answer may sound uncooperative . If UC simply signalled that the speaker has 
a certain colleague in mind, the answer should be as neutral as with a standard 
indefinite (un 'a' ) under the specific interpretation. So, we have to explain more 
precisely what is the contribution of Uc. 
3.3. The epistemic value of UC 
In fact, in (29b) and (34) , the speaker communicates that (i) she is able to identify 
her colleague and (ii) she knows of another identification by an epistemic agent, 
who is not necessarily the speaker herself. The latter identification may be provided 
in the sentence (see (30a» or be covert (see (30b), (29b), (34» . In the latter case, 
it is up to the reader to reconstruct the reasons why the speaker signals the second 
identification, hence variations in the perception of sentences (Hintikka makes a 
convergent remark about proper names with a certain) . Ignoring momentarily the 
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case of abstract nouns, we formulate the constraint on UC in (35) .  For simplicity, 
we stick to the ordinary conception of i . s .  as sets of models .  
(35) Let S be a sentence with a tripartite structure [uc] [N] [P] , where N refers to 
a physical entity. It is  appropriate only under an interpretation (i . s . )  s such 
that 
(i) the speaker knows which entity satisfies the proper I-type {N(x) &P(x) } 
in s and 
(ii) for some agent a, i . s .  s' and proper I-type 1l1(x) ,  (a) the speaker knows 
that a knows which entity satisfies \]! (x) in Sf , (b) the speaker knows that this 
entity is the same as the one that satisfies {N (x) & p (x) } ,  (c) a =J. speaker 
, 
or s =f. Sf . 
Definition (35)  captures the fact that the two identifications are independent, via 
subcondition (iic). Either the speaker has in mind an identification by another agent 
(a =f. speaker) , or she has in mind another identification (s =f. Sf) by herself. In (30a) 
the speaker identifies the diplomat as the person whom she met, and in (3 1 a) as 
the person she heard of through John. In addition, she mentions respectively other 
persons and John as agents who know the diplomat independently. In (36), if a is 
the speaker, then, at utterance time the speaker may identify the person in question 
as the person whom she met, and identify her independently as the person whom 
nobody knew at the party. 
(36) l' ai rencontre une certaine personne qu ' aucun invite ne connaissait (descrip­
tion of a party) 
'I met a certain person whom no guest knew' 
Next, UC is used to form certain expressions that have no clear connection with 
constraint (35) , see also (3 1 b) above. 
(37) a. Jean a tourne a un certain en droit 
'John turned at a certain place' 
b. 11 y a un lac a un certain endroit 
'There is a lake at a certain point' 
c. 11 a renonce a combattre, d 'une certaine maniere 
'He abandoned the fight, somewhat'  
In view of their frequency in corpora and their non sensitivity to modal cqntexts, 
these expressions are probably collocations . However, they might be partially ex­
plained considering that spatia-temporal landmarks (places, moments, etc . )  are 
likely to be known independently from the events they host. E.g . ,  (37b) implies that 
the lake is at a specific place identifiable independently from its presence. 
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4. The problem(s) of abstract nouns 
In this section, we look at differences linked with the varying nature of the nouns 
the items under considerations combine with. More precisely, we address the prob­
lems raised by the combination with abstract nouns such as tristesse ' sadness ' ,  
etonnement ' surprise' or temps ' time ' . DQ l exhibits no special behaviour6 , as it 
requires non-identification as usual, cf. (38) ,  and we will ignore it in the remainder. 
(38) a. J' ai eprouve un etonnement ?? quelconque devant ce spectacle 
'I felt some surprise at thls scene' 
b. Jean a bien dft eprouver un etonnement quelconque devant ce spectacle 
'Stil l ,  John must have felt some surprise at this scene' 
On the contrary, quelque waives its demand for a context ensuring non-identification 
with qualities (39a) ,  and DC no longer presupposes identification (39b,c) . 
(39) a. J' ai eprouve quelque etonnement devant ce spectacle 
'I felt some surprise at this scene' 
b. Jean a dft eprouver un certain etonnement devant ce spectacle 
'John must have felt some surprise at this scene' 
c .  La  separation des particules prend un certain temps, dont personne n 'a  
aucune idee 
'Particle splitting takes some time, about which nobody has any idea' 
We address two problems in turn : that of the semantic contribution of DC with 
abstract nouns and that of the variations of quelque with the . same nouns . 
4.1. UC and abstract nouns 
Traditionally, the denotational domain of mass nouns contains no individuals .  Dis­
continuity is brought in by the combination with UC, but its mode depends on the 
type of the N (Tovena 200 1 ) .  DC's cooccurrence with expressions such as meme 
(even) and en tout cas (anyway) works as a test to tease apart two modes . Roughly 
speaking, a sentence pair of the form P, (et) meme P' signals that P' is a stronger 
reason to believe some proposition p than P (see Anscombre 1 973, Kay 1 997 chap. 
2) . E.g., in (40a) , the possibility that John is a genius is a reason to beliete that 
John might solve a very complex problem that even an intelligent person, normally, 
would not be able to solve. The en tous cas test is symmetric: P, en tout cas P' 
signals that P '  is  weaker than P (J  ayez & Rossari 1999) . 
(40) a. Jean est intelligent, peut-etre meme genial 
'John is intelligent; he might even be a genius ' 
b. Jean est genial, en tout cas tres intelligent 
'John is a genius, very intelligent anyway' 
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With quantity-denoting nouns, configuration (4 1 )  shows that un certain suggests 
that the quantity is noticeable . For instance, (4 1 b) is strange because the speaker 
signals in the first sentence that the process in question takes a noticeable time, in 
the second sentence that it takes time and that the proposition denoted by the second 
sentence is stronger than the proposition denoted by the first. 
(4 1 )  a. C;a prend du temps, et meme un certain temps 
'It takes time, in fact it will take quite a while ' 
b. C;a prend un certain temps, et meme ?? du temps 
'It takes quite a while, it even takes time' 
c. C;a prend du temps, en tout cas #un certain temps 
'It takes time, anyway it takes quite a while' 
d. C;a prend un certain temps, en tout cas ?? du temps 
'It takes quite a while, it takes time anyway' 
With quality-denoting nouns ,  configuration (42) shows that UC suggests that the 
type of the quality (viz. surprise) is determined. Intuitively, (42a) is odd because 
the second clause signals  that the speaker felt a certain type of surprise. Using UC 
or a certain to relativize the truth of a sentence to a type is generally perceived as a 
form of downplaying because it implies that other types do not satisfy the property 
expressed by the sentence, see (42e) . 
(42) a. J' ai eprouve de la surprise, et meme une certaine ?? surprise 
'I was surprised, I was even surprised in some way'  
b. J '  ai eprouve une certaine surprise, et meme ?? de la suprise 
'I was surprised in some way, in fact I was surprised' 
c. J' ai eprouve de la surprise, en tout cas une certaine surprise 
'I was surprised, at least in some way' 
d. J '  ai eprouve une certaine surprise, en tous cas ?? de la surprise 
'I was surprised in some way, I was suprised anyway' 
e. This  program solves equations , ?? even / at least equations of a certain 
type 
Following (Bosveld-de Smet 1997), we assume that the existential pronoun du/de 
la signals an overlap relation betwen two entities . We assign to the determiner du 
the form (43a) .7 It says that any object that satisfies the generalized quantifier and 
any total amount of the substance of type P must overlap .  So  du temps refers to 
any object which is a part of (the total amount of) time. For mass nouns , we 'assign 
(43b) to Uc. It says that any object that satisfies the generalized quantifier must be a 
type or amount of P possibly identified by some agent. For quantities, the prefrred 
mode of identification is by degree/amount (P - amount), whereas identification 
by type is preferred for qualitites (P - type) .  
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(43) a. dUexist = >'P, Q .3x(P(x)&Q(x)&\:fy(total-amountp (y) =} overlap(x, y) ) ) .  
b. un certainmass = 
>'P, Q . 3x(O [3a (a knows which x)] &P-typej P - amount(x) &Q(x) ) .  
1 80 Jacques Jayez and Lucia Tovena 
Then, the contribution of un certain is to say that the overlap corresponds to a 
determinate amount/type of P, i .e .  an amount/type that an agent might identify. 
For instance, for (4 1 a) and (42c) , we get the following readings : ' It takes time, one 
can even say it takes a noticeable amount of time' and 'I felt surprise, a certain type 
of surprise at least' . 
4.2. Quelque and abstract nouns 
Our approach provides a solution also to the unexpected contrasts in (44), where all 
nouns are compatible with un certain but abstract mass nouns that mention phys­
ical dispositions or qualities of objt;Cts, situations or behaviours , appear not to be 
compatible with queZque, unlike nouns denoting psychological states ,  cf. (39a) .  
(44) a .  Le  j eu de ce pianiste souffre de ? ?  quelque lenteur 
'The playing of this pianist suffers from some (occasional) slowness '  
b .  Le  j eu de ce pianiste souffre d'une certaine lenteur 
'The playing of this pianist suffers from a certain slowness' 
c . Le paysage que je voyais par la fenetre recelait ?? quelque beaute 
'The landscape I was looking at through the window had some beauty in 
it' 
d. Le paysage que je voyais a travers la fenetre recelait une certaine beaute 
'The landscape I was looking at through the window had a certain beauty ' 
NPs in (44) are akin to tropes (Campbell 1 990, Macdonald 1 998) ,  i .e .  particular 
manifestations of abstract properties. Elaborating on Tovena's (to appear) proposal 
that complements of quelque denote entities that lack individuality, we divide tropes 
into external and original ones. Both are individuals ,  as shown by their incompati­
bility with standard indefinites, cf. (45) .  
(45) a. ?? An intelligence of John 
b. ?? A color of my car 
However, while external tropes are directly observed, original tropes are the re­
constructed causes of external manifestations . They are manifestations of some 
quality whose exact nature may be abduced in several possible ways. Thereby, 
they make room for indetermination. In French, many original tropes are noms de 
sentiment (Anscombre 1 995 among others) like amour ' l ove' , frayeur 'fear' , ex­
asperation ' exasperation ' ,  dedain 'contempt' ,  agacement ' irritation' ,  satisjaction 
' satisfaction' , disespoir 'despair' , con fiance 'confidence ' ,  jalousie 'jealousy ' ,  etc . ,  
which are compatible with quelque and un certain .  E.g. , Jean a montre que/que 
impatience ' John showed some impatience ' means that John had a certain (public) 
behaviour which points to ' some' (indeterminate) impatience. In contrast, nouns 
like lenteur 's lowness' , beaute 'beauty' ,  soup/esse ' litheness ' , elegance ' elegance' ,  
etc. are better with DC. Additional evidence that nouns for external tropes denote 
observable behaviour comes from the fact that these nouns are not felicitous as 
complements of suggerer ' to suggest' ,  in contrast with nouns for original tropes. 
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(46) a. Ce que je vois suggere beaucoup de frayeur 
'What I see suggests much fear' 
b. Ce que je  vois suggere ??beaucoup d' elegance [intended sense : physical 
elegance] 
'What I see suggests much elegance' 
5. Conclusion 
We have presented a set of episternic items that exploit the possibility/impossibility 
of identifying the referent of the NP� Two main findings emerged from this investi­
gation. First, the episternic sensitivity of the items cannot be reduced to "knowledge 
of the speaker" . In addition to the complication introduced by perpectives, there is 
the fact that UC invokes a scenario structure of "previous acquaintance" which may 
involve several agents . Second, the link between ignorance and indifference and 
the combination with abstract nouns show that the basic epistemic value is an ele­
ment of a more complex network of constraints . The behaviour of the semantically 
cognate FC! with respect to "indiscriminativity" (see Hom 2000 for just any, Jayez 
& Tovena 200 1 for n 'importe quel) indicates that the epistemic profile, the scales 
of relevance and importance and the type of the head noun interact in various ways  
and that the relation between determiners and (un)certainty i s  multidimensional .  
Endnotes 
[ 1 ]  More precisely, cancellation occurs only in such cases as the result of discourse 
revision, s ignalled, for instance, by special discourse markers like in Jact: John met 
some of the girls conversationally implicates that John did not meet all the girls .  
One can cancel this implicature by adding in fact he met them all. 
[2] UQ l can also specify the subject: Avec ce nouveau logiciel, un texte (quel­
conque) peut etre scanne 'With this new software, a text (any text) can be scanned' . 
Some speakers accept even the emphatic form Un texte QUELCONQUE peut etre 
scanne ( 'ANY text can be scanned' ) , without any restrictive adjunct. 
[3] We ignore the relation between worlds (w, Wi) and situations s for simplicity. 
[4] We do not claim that n 'importe quel or any are not exception-tolerant, that i s  
that the mediating property of  IS-generics coincides with the restriction wheljl these 
items specify the subject. The empirical data are not clear enough to support or fal­
sify such a claim. 
[5] The adjective certain ' sure' is intuitively related to the determiners, like quel­
conque with respect to UQ 1 and UQ2. However, the sense of the determiners using 
certain cannot be described as compositionally involving the sense of the adjective .  
[6] Its indifference value may have certain effects, though. 
[7] For simplicity, we ignore the special treatment that Bosveld-de Smet proposes 
for specifier-deterrniner pairs and we recast her analysis into the standard format 
for determiners . 
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